Negotiations to sell SATA “at speed” resulted in a bid of €17 million for 85 percent of the company, with the rest of the deal unknown. The Regional Government immediately asked the European Union for another year to privatize the company, which could cost the public coffers another €80 million. How do you assess this new situation?

Assuming that no one wants a company with more than €400 million in liabilities, even 17 cents would be a good price.

The problem is that it will be sold with its liabilities cleared, with restructured routes, with a savings plan in place, with aircraft and slots as assets, and with employees accepting a temporary reduction in some privileges, so €17 million is not much. However, the alternative is to continue with the company as it is, that is, with accumulated liabilities and the prospect of continuing to collect more losses. In fact, the great mystery in this process is how the consortium manages to reach an agreement with the unions to reduce costs, something that the current owner—the Regional Government—has never managed to do, at least on this scale. As for the request for a postponement, it is nonsense, but given the mediocre leadership in the European Commission, it is obvious that the request will be granted.

There was more than enough time for this process to be resolved this year. José Manuel Bolieiro, Duarte Freitas, and Berta Cabral are responsible for the collapse of the negotiations, first refusing to sell to the consortium, then later accepting for fear of the courts, then accepting the consortium’s requests for postponement, a low-quality soap opera whose bill will be passed on to all of us taxpayers, with another year of accumulated losses to pay for.

This privatization may even be completed next year, but it is still a negotiating disaster. It is a government completely captured by the only consortium. In a private company, the negotiators would all be fired.

Wouldn’t it be preferable to liquidate the company, as has already been suggested, and establish agreements with credible, non-blackmailing companies that can do the work that would otherwise remain undone, and at reasonable prices?

It is already too late. The European Commission, far away and closed in offices filled with bureaucratic advisors, would not allow this process to go back to square one. That is why the Azores government was forced to negotiate only with this consortium. All of this was poorly managed from the outset, with a privatization process in which there should have been no tender, but direct negotiations with interested parties. All they had to do was copy the TAP reprivatization process.

Wouldn’t it be preferable to liquidate the company, as has already been suggested, and establish agreements with credible, non-blackmailing companies that can do the work that would otherwise remain undone, at reasonable prices?

It is already too late. The European Commission, far away and closed in offices filled with bureaucratic advisors, would not allow this process to go back to the beginning. Hence, the Azores Government was forced to negotiate only with this consortium. All of this has been poorly managed from the outset, with a privatization process that should not have involved a tender, but rather direct negotiations with interested parties. All they had to do was copy the TAP reprivatization process.

SATA “jet” was created in a context where it was considered important to bring tourists to the Azores, especially to São Miguel. The debt that has since been created may be close to €800 million, according to some sources, not to mention the money “poured” into the company over many years. Was it worth it? Did we misjudge our ability to generate resources to sustain such a company?

Azores Airlines was and is an essential tool for our accessibility and tourism. For all the islands, not just São Miguel. It is like TAP, which brings tourists to Lisbon, Porto, or Faro, but who travel throughout the country. The problem is not the creation of the company, which always made a profit under the management of António Cansado. The problem was the political interference of the PS governments of César and Vasco Cordeiro, who ruined the company, together with the incompetent managers they appointed over time. The problem has worsened in the present because the current coalition government, which has learned nothing from history, has maintained the same interference, even more careless because it is captured by the political interests of three different parties, leading the company to the situation it finds itself in today.

How do you assess the Azorean political process and the political actors in this SATA process, given that the two largest parties (PSD and PS) are involved in the creation and management of the company? Has there been too much politics and too little management over time?

Of course there has. The previous government fell due to political attrition caused by SATA, and this one is going down the same path. Dragging this problem on for another year, the penultimate year of the term, is a basic political mistake, which the coalition will pay dearly for at the polls. When we reach November next year, when all parties will take stock of the implementation of the Plan and Budget, the PRR, and the privatization of SATA, they will obviously conclude that everything has been done badly, and none of them—including Chega—will want to be associated with the government’s unpopularity. This means that the most likely scenario is the non-approval of the Plan and Budget for 2027 and the consequent fall of the government. Bolieiro runs the risk of going down in the history of Autonomy as the first president who did not complete a single term!

What do you fear most with regard to air transport in the future of the Azores? Being left without a “flag” company to guarantee connections to the outside world? Discovering that the regional SATA has been contaminated by the blunders we have seen in the “jet” SATA? A public tender that hands over the connection between the islands to an outside company?

The privatization of Azores Airlines does not mean that we will be left without access to the outside world. Public service obligations remain in place and there will certainly be adjustments to operations with the outside world due to the likely cancellation of Ryanair routes. Airlines flying to the Azores will be on the lookout for more opportunities. We should be more concerned about the government’s passivity in the face of all these scenarios. It has been more than demonstrated that, when it comes to reorganizing transport—both air and sea—this government is completely incapable of managing the processes. SATA is what it is, Easyjet was what we saw, Ryanair is what we are witnessing, Ponta Delgada airport looks like a state of siege in the summer, the problem of extending the runway at Pico remains shelved, the one at Horta is in the hands of our friend Arnaut, whom no one bothers and who even has his luggage carried when he comes here on his annual mission to collect taxes, maritime transport is what we all know it to be, so this list of ruinous management is not a good calling card for any government in need of a major overhaul. May the Christmas season enlighten Dr. Bolieiro!

In Diário Insular-José Lourenço-director

Translated into English as a community outreach program by the Portuguese Beyond Borders Institute (PBBI) and the Modern and Classical Languages and Literatures Department (MCLL), in collaboration with Bruma Publication and ADMA (Azores-Diaspora Media Alliance) at California State University, Fresno. PBBI thanks Luso Financial for sponsoring NOVIDADES.