1 — A GOVERNMENT AT RISK OF COLLAPSE
It requires little imagination to foresee that the new year will bring turbulence to the Region, given the warning signs already visible in both the economy and the political arena.

The year 2026 is pivotal for the Recovery and Resilience Plan (PRR), which expires at the end of the summer. It will also encompass the execution of the annual Investment Plan, the presentation of the next plan for 2027, and the conclusion—at least formally—of the long-drawn-out privatization process of SATA. These are three strategic pillars of decisive importance for the Azores, and they provide fertile ground for opposition parties eager to assess, and challenge, the Regional Government’s performance on each front.

The most opportune moment for such a reckoning will come after the summer recess, with the reopening of the parliamentary session and the presentation of the 2027 Plan and Budget in October. From what is being heard in opposition circles, the assessment is expected to be “deeply negative,” and the possibility of the next Plan and Budget being rejected—and the government consequently falling—cannot be ruled out.

Does this make sense midway through a term? That will depend entirely on the government’s performance throughout the year. For now, the outlook is bleak.

Chega, which until now has helped sustain the governing coalition, has entered a phase of increasingly sharp criticism. It has expressed profound dissatisfaction with the conduct of José Manuel Bolieiro’s administration and, even at mid-legislature, will not wish to be tethered to the image of a weak government—one criticized across the Region by social partners, mayors, and citizens alike. Above all, Chega is keen to avoid being perceived as the coalition’s political “crutch.”

Nor will the PRR serve any longer as a mitigating excuse. In the last Plan and Budget, the opposition abstained responsibly, arguing that it was essential to seize all available European funds and avoid delaying their implementation. That argument has now worn thin.

Given that full execution of the PRR is widely understood to be unattainable, that the Investment Plan’s performance is likely to be underwhelming, and that the privatization of SATA has been a resounding failure—continuing to erode the government regardless of its eventual outcome—the opposition is well positioned to show José Manuel Bolieiro a political red card.

Add to this a growing popular discontent spreading across all the islands, exacerbated by a rising cost of living and a slowdown in tourism—and thus in the regional economy—and the conditions are ripe for the opposition to bring down the executive.

If it does not happen during the next budget debate, it is almost certain to occur in 2027. That, at least, is the scenario taking shape behind opposition doors.

Within the coalition, however, there remains confidence that most voters do not see the opposition—particularly the Socialists—as a credible alternative. Francisco César is still regarded as the coalition’s political “life insurance.” While not seeking early elections, the coalition believes itself prepared to win again under any circumstances, and to count once more on Chega, which remains determined to keep the PS out of power.

There is, moreover, one final card Bolieiro may yet play at the end of the summer: a cabinet reshuffle. With Chega calling for a new style of governance, the coalition could opt for a reconfiguration—perhaps replacing a few cabinet secretaries—arguing that it delayed such changes because all ministers were fully engaged in PRR programming.

Whether that will be enough to “tame” Chega remains uncertain, particularly given that José Pacheco is among those within the party who subscribe to a blunt maxim: “If the government does not change, we will change the government.”

In short, this administration will remain on a political tightrope throughout the year. Given its evident fragilities and strategic disorientation in several key policy areas, the most likely outcome is a year of sustained political agitation.

2 — THE ECONOMY OF ELITES AND THE ECONOMY OF CITIZENS
The Finance Secretary’s decision to open the year with a press conference reviewing the economic performance of 2025 was a direct response to Chega’s concerns.

Duarte Freitas sought to demonstrate that, despite the largest public debt in the history of Azorean Autonomy and the collapse of several state-owned enterprises, the economy is “robust” and has never performed better—even when compared with Socialist administrations.

The numbers may be impressive on paper. For citizens, however, what matters is the state of their wallets at the end of the month.

Government officials like to emphasize that the economy has grown for more than 50 consecutive months. What they are less eager to say is that this growth is visibly slowing. In 2024, only three months registered economic activity growth of 2 percent. In 2025, not a single month reached that mark.

These are anemic growth rates, below the pace of inflation, and they do not translate into tangible improvements for household finances. The result is mounting public dissatisfaction, evident across every sector of society.

Freitas’s press conference was heavy on statistics but light on reassurance. Citizens are increasingly aware that the regional economy rests almost exclusively on tourism—an industry that delivers full employment but not decent wages, while simultaneously driving up the cost of living in essentials such as food, energy, and housing.

In effect, two economies now coexist in the Region: one for those who leverage European funds to grow, and another for middle-class citizens who reach month’s end with empty pockets.

The Finance Secretary himself fell into contradiction when he announced public-sector savings of €30 million, only to admit at the same press conference that the health sector alone consumes the lion’s share of the regional budget, with the Hospital do Divino Espírito Santo emerging as “the Region’s principal cost center.”

In other words, there are no real savings at all.

3 — SUBMISSION TO LISBON
For a government already worn down by repeated failures and a lack of strategic vision in key areas of the regional economy, the one political lifeline might have been a confrontation with the national government—an opportunity to turn Lisbon’s centralism into a rallying cry and divert attention from domestic shortcomings.

Even that opportunity was squandered.

The Regional Government adopted a weak and submissive stance in the case of overdue wages at the Misericórdias. More recently—and inexplicably—it reacted late and without coordination with Madeira to the scandalous chaos surrounding the Mobility Subsidy regulation. Madeira acted swiftly and forcefully; the Azores did not.

Miguel Albuquerque offered Bolieiro a lesson in how to deal with incompetence and centralism, regardless of party affiliation.

The Azorean branch of the PSD, reacting belatedly and only in Madeira’s wake—once it became clear that the issue dominated public conversation—now appears hostage to the arrogance of Luís Montenegro and to a minister caricatured locally as a “dandy from Cascais,” who for the second time has turned the Azorean coalition into a political doormat.

That minister needs to be brought to heel, as others were in the past—notably the Socialist Ana Vitorino, who once sought to strip the Region of shared maritime governance.

As the Azores mark 50 years of Autonomy, projecting an image of subjugation to Lisbon’s Terreiro do Paço is a collective embarrassment. It also confirms the scenario outlined at the beginning of this essay: the coalition has been losing internal momentum for some time, falters before Lisbon, and commands the allegiance of ever fewer voters.

Bolieiro and his coalition partners would do well to heed the warning signs.

Published in Açoriano Oriental · Diário Insular · Portuguese Times USA · LusoPresse Montreal

Osvaldo Cabral is an emeritus journalist with over 40 years of experience covering the Azores. He was the director of RTP-A (the public television station) and the Diário dos Açores newspaper. He is a regular columnist for many newspapers throughout the Azpres and the Diaspora.

NOVIDADES will feature occasional opinion pieces from various leading thinkers and writers in the Azores, providing the diaspora and those interested in the current state of the Azores with insight into the diverse opinions on some of the archipelago’s key issues.

Translated to English as a community outreach program from the Portuguese Beyond Borders Institute (PBBI) and the Modern and Classical Languages and Literatures Department (MCLL).