What we witnessed on election night, Sunday (JANUARY 18TH, 2026), was merely the confirmation that an electoral insurrection is already underway—one that the traditional parties have failed to recognize.

Party leaders continue to behave as if we still lived in the era of poster-pasting and leaflet distribution, oblivious to the emergence of a large and growing segment of the electorate: young voters with no party loyalty, volatile in their choices, deeply immersed in digital platforms, and fully capable of deciding election outcomes.

That is precisely what happened across the country, particularly in the Azores and Madeira—longstanding strongholds of the parties that make up the governing establishment—where voters did not follow party directives, especially the PSD’s appeals to support its candidate.

The insurrection is in motion and will leave its mark on future elections unless the traditional parties change course and stop pretending this has nothing to do with them.

Consider the case of the Azores.

It is estimated that the Region has more than 24,000 young people of voting age, all born after April 25 and with no lived memory of the early years of autonomy—much less of the first regional governments under Mota Amaral.

This is a generation disconnected from traditional media and reachable almost exclusively through digital platforms, with constant exposure to social networks. They are bombarded daily with massive amounts of disinformation, have no allegiance to political parties, speak in an angry register, and tend to adopt more extreme positions on the problems and hardships of their daily lives, which are many.

If we consider that actual voter turnout in the Azores (not registered voters, but those who actually cast ballots) averages around 100,000 people, then a bloc of 24,000 or more young voters carries decisive weight in any election.

It is therefore no surprise that support for Chega and its leader, André Ventura, has grown steadily, nor that the results achieved on São Miguel have been significant. The populist leader has become a genuine electoral phenomenon in the Region, with significant vote growth.

Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, who achieved one of his strongest results in the Azores, increased his vote total from 40,000 in 2016 to 56,000 in 2021—an increase of 16,000 votes. By contrast, André Ventura gained 17,000 votes between 2021 and 2026—half a decade—setting a record for rapid electoral growth.

Youth voting played a decisive role in this phenomenon. It is no coincidence that Ventura recorded his strongest results in municipalities on São Miguel with a higher concentration of young voters, combined with stronger support in rural areas and lower-income zones—patterns confirmed by University of Lisbon polling in other parts of the country.

As a telling footnote that reinforces this thesis, there were two parishes on São Miguel—Fenais da Ajuda and Achadinha—where Ventura won an outright majority. If the rest of the country had voted like those two deeply rural communities in the island’s north, there would have been no need for a second round.

São Miguel is becoming a serious electoral problem for the traditional parties. Chega has not yet achieved even higher results in regional elections only because it lacks credible local candidates—yet that has not stopped its steady growth from election to election, even after scandals such as the deputy caught stealing luggage.

If António José Seguro hopes to reclaim São Miguel in the second round, he cannot campaign across the island flanked by Socialist Party leaders. Francisco César and his team, tempting as it may be to associate themselves with a candidate’s momentum, will need to step aside. Otherwise, voters who supported Mendes and Cotrim will also turn away from Seguro.

As for Bolieiro, he finds himself in the same bind as Montenegro: he cannot oppose Chega by backing Seguro, only to later knock on Ventura’s and Pacheco’s doors to negotiate budgets and parliamentary support.

This is mere political maneuvering—likely to carry electoral consequences in the short- or medium-term. But it was their choice. They chose—badly—the candidate they stubbornly imposed on their party bases. The militants responded with an insurrection.

Let them at least learn this lesson: parties do not own voters.

Published in Açoriano Oriental · Diário Insular · Portuguese Times USA · LusoPresse Montreal

Osvaldo Cabral is an emeritus journalist with over 40 years of experience covering the Azores. He was the director of RTP-A (the public television station) and the Diário dos Açores newspaper. He is a regular columnist for many newspapers throughout the Azpres and the Diaspora.

NOVIDADES will feature occasional opinion pieces from various leading thinkers and writers in the Azores, providing the diaspora and those interested in the current state of the Azores with insight into the diverse opinions on some of the archipelago’s key issues.

Translated to English as a community outreach program from the Portuguese Beyond Borders Institute (PBBI) and the Modern and Classical Languages and Literatures Department (MCLL).