Preparing for a natural disaster often requires authorities to imagine the worst while hoping it never happens. Emergency planning is built not on predictions but on preparedness, developing operational responses to scenarios that may never unfold but for which governments must nonetheless be ready. In the Azores, where seismic and volcanic activity forms part of everyday geological reality, that philosophy has shaped a comprehensive series of emergency plans designed to protect communities living in areas of elevated volcanic risk.

The Regional Government of the Azores has confirmed that Civil Protection authorities developed contingency plans to evacuate the population of Cinco Ribeiras, on Terceira Island, by land, sea, or air under a hypothetical scenario in which lava flows from the Santa Bárbara volcano threatened the parish. At the same time, the Government categorically rejected claims that any official studies had projected significant numbers of fatalities during the recent seismic-volcanic crisis.

The clarification was provided in response to a parliamentary inquiry submitted by Nuno Barata, deputy for the Liberal Initiative, concerning the management of the Santa Bárbara seismic-volcanic crisis and the prolonged closure of the Raminho Road, one of the principal access routes serving Terceira’s western communities.

According to the Government, the Azores Regional Civil Protection and Fire Service developed multiple operational scenarios to address various possible evolutions of the volcanic crisis, including one in which lava flows could affect parts of western Terceira. These scenarios were created strictly as emergency planning tools rather than scientific forecasts or assessments of the likelihood that such events would occur.

One of those scenarios was incorporated into the large-scale TOURO24 civil protection exercise conducted between June 6 and 8, 2024. The simulation envisioned lava flows reaching Cinco Ribeiras and requiring the evacuation of residents through a coordinated operation utilizing ground transportation, maritime resources, and aerial support.

The Government emphasized that responsibility for scientific monitoring remained with the Azores Seismic and Volcanic Information and Surveillance Center (CIVISA), whose assessments never indicated that an eruption was imminent. During the crisis, the highest volcanic alert level reached was V3, remaining below V4, the classification associated with a pre-eruptive situation.

Responding directly to allegations that official authorities had prepared casualty projections, the Government stated that it neither produced nor possesses any reports, studies, technical opinions, or official assessments containing estimates of potential fatalities.

The parliamentary inquiry followed an editorial published by the Diário Insular newspaper that referred to the possible existence of official maps or planning scenarios forecasting significant loss of life. In its response, the Government confirmed the preparation of evacuation scenarios but firmly denied that any calculations of expected casualties had ever been undertaken.

Officials also clarified that no volcanic hazard maps were specifically produced to predict the simultaneous closure of all major roads serving western Terceira. Operational mapping did, however, consider the possibility that volcanic activity could affect transportation infrastructure, leading Civil Protection authorities to prepare a detailed evacuation strategy outlining responsibilities, evacuation routes, coordination procedures, and public warning systems, including emergency SMS alerts.

Emergency planners also identified ports, small harbors, and potential helicopter landing sites capable of supporting maritime or aerial evacuations should road access become unavailable. Procedures were likewise established to facilitate the rapid reopening of the Raminho Road whenever emergency conditions permitted.

As part of those preparedness efforts, the Regional Government invested approximately €400,000 to improve an alternative forest road serving as a backup route to the closed regional highway. The project included widening sections of the roadway and applying asphalt pavement to improve accessibility during emergency operations.

The Government acknowledged, however, that no technical study was conducted comparing the evacuation capacity of the Raminho Road with that of the alternative routes or demonstrating that the substitute network offered equivalent functionality. Nevertheless, officials maintained that none of the technical evaluations concluded that residents lacked adequate evacuation options or that the road closure alone created an unacceptable level of risk.

Emergency procedures continued to be refined through a series of civil protection exercises following TOURO24. These included BASALTO 24.4, conducted in October 2024 in Cinco Ribeiras, BASALTO 25.3, held in September 2025 in Biscoitos and simulating an eruptive crisis requiring evacuation, and additional exercises throughout 2026, including BASALTO 26.1, BASALTO 26.2, and TOURO, reflecting the Region’s continuing commitment to preparedness.

The controversy surrounding the Raminho Road stems from its closure following the January 14, 2024 earthquake, which destabilized the steep volcanic slope above the highway, causing rockfalls onto the roadway.

According to Report 7/2024 prepared by the Regional Laboratory for Civil Engineering (LREC), the slope received 68 points on the Volcanic Terrain Landslide Susceptibility Index, placing it within the category of high susceptibility for future slope failures. Engineers concluded that the hillside remained “far from achieving stability” and continued to present particular vulnerability during periods of seismic activity.

The report recommended that any partial reopening should initially be limited to a single traffic lane protected by approximately 250 meters of concrete barriers, temporary traffic signals, and crack sealing measures. Full reopening, engineers advised, should only occur after seismic activity had subsided or the slope had been permanently stabilized.

Supporting documents released by the Government include both LREC engineering reports, public awareness materials, a chronology of civil protection initiatives undertaken throughout the crisis, and records of official public communications. Officials noted that only documentation considered public or suitable for public disclosure was included in the parliamentary response.

The Government’s detailed explanation underscores the distinction between scientific forecasting and emergency planning. While Civil Protection authorities are expected to prepare for a wide range of potential scenarios—including highly improbable ones—the executive insists that such operational exercises should not be interpreted as predictions of future volcanic activity. Instead, they represent the precautionary planning required of emergency management agencies responsible for safeguarding communities living in one of Europe’s most geologically active archipelagos.

Based on a story from Diário dos Açores – Paulo Viveiros, director. Photo from DA.