Pedro Castro argues that a sharp reduction in outsourced aircraft, a smaller flight schedule, and increased passenger revenue explain the airline’s financial improvement, while questioning the consequences of changes to Portugal’s mobility subsidy system.

The improvement in the SATA Group’s financial results is being driven largely by a substantial reduction in Azores Airlines’ operations, a dramatic decline in the use of externally leased aircraft, and higher revenue from passengers, rather than by an expansion of the airline’s business, according to aviation specialist Pedro Castro. In an interview with Diário dos Açores, conducted by journalist Vasco Blayer, Castro argued that the company’s recent performance reveals a fundamental shift in its operating strategy, while raising questions about rising airfares, reduced competition, and the effects of public policies on air travel between the Azores and mainland Portugal.

Castro emphasized that understanding the SATA Group’s financial performance requires distinguishing between its two airlines. SATA Air Açores operates primarily under public service obligations, providing essential inter-island transportation under a system of public compensation. Its financial performance is therefore closely connected to the terms of those obligations. Azores Airlines, which operates routes beyond the archipelago, presents a different situation. Historically, it has accounted for the overwhelming majority of the group’s financial losses. Castro recalled that a 2023 audit by Portugal’s Court of Auditors identified Azores Airlines as responsible for approximately 90% of the accumulated losses during the period examined. Consequently, he argued, any meaningful assessment of the group’s financial recovery must focus primarily on changes within Azores Airlines.

The most significant change, according to Castro, has been the reduction in the airline’s flight operations. During the third quarter of 2026, Azores Airlines operated 6.5% fewer flights than during the corresponding period in 2025. That followed an earlier reduction of approximately 7.3% between the third quarters of 2024 and 2025. Looking ahead, the flight schedules already available in reservation systems for the third quarter of 2027 indicate another decrease. Taken together, these changes suggest that the airline’s operations could shrink by almost 17% between 2024 and 2027. “Under the conditions in which Azores Airlines operates, the less it flies, the better its financial results tend to be,” Castro observed, acknowledging that the conclusion may initially appear paradoxical.

Operating fewer flights reduces expenses directly associated with flying, including fuel, airport charges, ground handling, and other variable costs. Castro also noted that changes to onboard catering have reduced expenditure and created an additional revenue source, since passengers on flights to mainland Portugal and other European destinations must now pay separately for food and beverages. However, he cautioned that reducing flight frequencies does not automatically eliminate fixed expenses. Aircraft, personnel, and the airline’s administrative structure continue to generate costs regardless of the number of flights operated. A smaller operation can produce lasting financial improvements only when reductions target routes or capacity that previously generated losses, while the airline maintains or increases revenue from its remaining services and manages its fixed costs effectively.

One of the most striking changes has involved the use of ACMI contracts, arrangements through which an airline obtains aircraft, crews, maintenance, and insurance from an external operator. Castro identified the reduction in these contracts as a major contributor to the improvement in Azores Airlines’ financial performance. During the third quarter of 2024, more than 650 flights were operated using externally contracted aircraft and crews. That number declined to more than 400 during the same period in 2025 and fell to just 21 in the third quarter of 2026. The scale of the reduction, he argued, indicates a substantial change in the airline’s approach to scheduling and fleet management.

According to Castro, the airline appears to have moved toward planning its operations according to the aircraft and personnel it actually has available, rather than scheduling flights that subsequently require extensive reliance on outside operators. He questioned the financial logic of contracting additional aircraft and crews for services that might already struggle to generate sufficient revenue when operated with the airline’s own resources. The SATA Group’s financial statement, he noted, supports the significance of this development, reporting that ACMI expenses declined by approximately €6.1 million, or 48%, through September 2026, a reduction associated with greater utilization of the company’s own fleet.

Although Castro acknowledged that ACMI contracts can be necessary in commercial aviation, particularly during aircraft breakdowns, unexpected disruptions, or periods of exceptionally high demand, he argued that their extensive use by Azores Airlines in previous years deserves closer examination. He called for scrutiny of the operational justification for individual contracts, their costs, the decision-making processes involved, the selection of suppliers, and the alternatives available at the time. In his view, the scale of previous outsourcing arrangements warrants an investigation comparable in rigor to earlier examinations involving the aircraft known as Cachalote. If evidence of irregularities were to emerge, he added, the appropriate authorities should investigate.

The airline’s financial improvement, however, cannot be explained by cost reductions alone. Castro’s analysis suggests that Azores Airlines has also increased the revenue generated by each flight. In addition to higher average ticket prices, the company has expanded revenue from ancillary services, including seat reservations, additional baggage, onboard catering, and upgrades. The combination of fewer flights and greater revenue per flight has therefore contributed to improved operating results. Castro also cautioned against evaluating fuel costs in isolation, arguing that the financial impact of higher jet fuel prices must be considered alongside the extent to which those increases have been passed on to passengers.

A particularly controversial element of his analysis concerns changes to Portugal’s Social Mobility Subsidy, which supports travel between the Azores and mainland Portugal. Castro argued that the removal of the previous maximum fare eligible for reimbursement has contributed to substantial increases in airline ticket prices. According to market data he cited, the average base fare charged by Azores Airlines on the Ponta Delgada–Lisbon route increased by approximately 45%, compared with an increase of around 30% in TAP’s average fare on the same route. On flights between Ponta Delgada and Porto, where Azores Airlines became the sole operator, the average fare increase exceeded 50%.

These increases were considerably higher than the approximately 15% rise Castro estimated across Azores Airlines’ overall network during the third quarter of 2026. He attributed part of the difference to the withdrawal of Ryanair services, which reduced competition and available capacity, but argued that changes to the mobility subsidy system also played an important role. In his assessment, the combination of fewer flights, reduced competition, and a reimbursement system without the previous fare ceiling has created conditions in which airlines can charge substantially higher prices while public funds absorb a greater share of eligible residents’ travel expenses.

Castro was particularly critical of what he considers the wider consequences for the regional economy. While the revised subsidy arrangements may improve the financial performance of Azores Airlines, he argued that higher fares can make the archipelago less competitive as a vacation destination for travelers from mainland Portugal. He emphasized that mainland Portugal represents the largest source market for tourism throughout the Azores, making the affordability and availability of air connections especially important to the regional tourism industry.

His criticism extends to the relationship between government intervention and airline profitability. In Castro’s assessment, the current arrangement may benefit Azores Airlines financially while producing undesirable consequences for consumers, public expenditure, and tourism competitiveness. He characterized the policy as a failure and directed criticism toward Regional Secretary for Tourism, Mobility and Infrastructure Berta Cabral, whom he associates with the government’s support for the airline. These assessments reflect Castro’s interpretation of the available data rather than conclusions independently established by the financial results.

The analysis presents a more complex picture of SATA’s improved financial performance than the headline figures alone might suggest. Azores Airlines has reduced its operations, sharply curtailed its reliance on expensive external aircraft and crews, and increased the revenue generated by the flights it continues to operate. Together, these developments have contributed to stronger financial results, but they also raise questions about the consequences of a smaller airline network and higher fares for residents, businesses, and visitors.

For Castro, the central issue is not simply whether Azores Airlines has improved its accounts, but how that improvement has been achieved and whether the operating model can remain financially sustainable without undermining the accessibility of air transportation. His analysis highlights the continuing challenge facing the Azores: reconciling the financial viability of its airlines with affordable connections, a competitive tourism sector, and the responsible use of public resources.

Based on an interview by Vasco Blayer in Diário dos Açores, Paulo Viveiros-director. The photos are from DA and SATA-Azores Airlines.